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Empirical studies on total factor productivity growth (TFPG) in developing countries highlight trade open-ness, 
research and development and market structure as being the most important determinants of TFPG. The role of 
institutions remains overlooked in the literature on the determinants of TFPG. In this paper, we look into the role 
of institutional quality as captured by effective state-business relationships (SBRs) in influencing TFPG, using 
Indian manufacturing as a case-study. By SBRs we mean a set of highly institutionalised, responsive and public 
interactions between the state and the business sector. To compute TFPG, we use firm level data for both the 
formal and informal manufacturing sector. We correct for the simultaneity bias associated with the production 
function approach for TFPG estimation by employing a method developed by Levinsohn and Petrin. We propose 
measures of effective SBRs for 15 Indian States over the period 1994-2005, and then use them in TFP growth 
equations to estimate the effect of SBR on TFPG. The results indicate that SBR has positively affected the TFP 
growth of Indian industry. The effect however is primarily for the formal sector.
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I. Introduction
It has been shown that long-term growth and development across countries is driven to a large extent 
by productivity growth (Easterly and Levine, 2001).1 Several studies exist that have attempted to 
examine the effect of different factors influencing productivity growth using industries or firms as 
units of analysis. Most of these studies highlight the role of trade open-ness, research and development
and market structure as major determinants of industry or firm productivity growth (see for example, 
Harris, 1999, Bartelsman and Doms, 2000, Tybout, 2000, Chand and Sen, 2002, Goldar and Kumari,
2003, Isaksson, 2007, and Mitra and Ural, 2007). While trade, technology and market structure are 
important determinants of productivity growth, there has been less recognition in this literature of the 
importance of institutions (North, 1994). In this paper, we examine the role of a specific set of 
institutions – effective state business relations - in explaining productivity growth across industries. 
By effective state business relations (SBRs) we mean a set of highly institutionalized, responsive and 
public interactions between the state and the business sector. Case-studies of the East Asian 
experience suggest that collaborative relations between the state and the private sector was crucial in 
bringing about economic growth in that region (Amsden, 1992, Maxfield and Schneider, 1997, 
Harriss, 2006). While much of the literature on SBRs have looked at their effects on economic 
performance at the macro level (Sen and te Velde, 2009), our interest in this paper is to examine the 
micro-level impact of effective SBRs by testing for the effects of effective SBRs on total factor 
productivity growth (TFPG) using industries as units of analysis. Our empirical context is Indian 
manufacturing, and we examine whether the variation in TFPG across Indian states can be related to 
variations in effective SBRs across these states. 
We first propose a measure of effective SBRs for the 15 major Indian states for the period 1994-2005.
We then exploit the differences in institutional quality across Indian states (as measured by our SBR 
index) to examine the effects of the SBR measure on total factor productivity growth across industries 
and states and over time. India provides a rich empirical context to study the impact of effective state-
business relations on manufacturing productivity for three reasons. Firstly, differences in regional 
industrial performance persist, in spite of the dismantling of the License Raj regime in 1991 and 
significant trade liberalization since the 1990s.2 These policy reforms should have led to a 
convergence of industrial productivity growth across Indian States, but this has not happened.  
Secondly, India’s federal structure and the significant political autonomy and independence in 
legislative powers enjoyed by state governments, along with regional variations in the collective 
                                                
1
According to a recent study by the Center for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS), in countries with the 
lowest GINI indices, a one per cent rise in labour productivity is associated with 1.02% decline in the incidence 
of poverty. However, for countries with the highest GINI indices, the impact is less than a half per cent (CSLS, 
2003).
2 In the cross-country context Harrigan (1999) has also observed a lack of convergence of TFP for the same 
industries across OECD countries. 
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strength of the economic and political elite allows for the variation in regional institutional quality that 
may allow us to identify its effects on TFPG. Finally, the availability of firm level data for the Indian 
manufacturing (encompassing both the formal and informal segments of the manufacturing sector) 
allows us to estimate TFPG at a very disaggregated level of analysis – corresponding to the ISIC 5 
digit level – and thus, circumvent the problem of aggregation bias in productivity estimates that is a 
common feature of most empirical studies on productivity for developing countries. As has been 
increasingly realized in the modern literature on productivity, there is significant degree of 
heterogeneity in productivity across firms and industries, and the more disaggregated the estimates of 
productivity, the more accurate these estimates are likely to be (Melitz, 2003).
Our paper has two important methodological strengths. Firstly, we are able to test for the effects of 
effective SBR on TFPG for the combined manufacturing sector, which includes both the formal and 
informal segments of the manufacturing sector. Previous studies on TFPG in Indian manufacturing 
have estimated TFPG only for the formal manufacturing sector. This is a serious omission as nearly 35
per cent of output and 85 per cent of employment in Indian manufacturing are in the informal sector
(Mukherjee, 2004). A second strength of the empirical analysis is that we use the Levinsohn-Petrin 
method of calculating total factor productivity growth, which addresses the simultaneity bias in 
standard productivity estimates.
The remaining paper is organized in six sections. Section II summarizes the theoretical and empirical 
literature on determinants of productivity growth, and discusses the role of effective state business 
relations in enhancing productivity. Section III describes the methodologies, both in estimating TFPG, 
and in testing for the effects of effective SBRs on TFPG. Section IV discusses how we can measure 
effective SBRs in the Indian context. This is followed by a description of the data and variables used 
in the empirical analysis in Section V. The section then provides the estimates of TFPG calculations. 
Section VI provides the results of the TFP growth estimations, where we test for the effects of 
effective SBR on TFPG. Section VII concludes.
II. What Determines Productivity Growth in Industry? 
The literature has proposed various potential determinants of industry or firm productivity. These 
include trade and openness, ownership, role of institutions such as labour market, public investment in 
health, human capital, physical infrastructure leading to better quality of work force, research and 
development (R and D), and the business environment. As can be seen, the factors can be categorized 
into policy variables or institutions.3
                                                
3 While institutions consist of rules – formal and informal - and norms within which individuals and firms 
function, policies refer to various measures a government adopts to achieve its goals and objectives within the 
country's institutional framework (Mitra and Ural, 2007). In many cases, the dividing line between policies and 
institutions is very blurred.
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There are reasons to expect a favorable effect from trade or openness on industrial productivity. Trade 
leads to efficient production through gains from specialization and exchange (Mitra and Ural, 2007). 
Availability of larger variety of inputs can augment firms’ productivity through greater division of 
labour and/or through better matching between output and inputs (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2005). The 
increased competitive pressure on industrial units in a liberalized trade regime force them to be more 
efficient in the use of resources (through better organization of production, or effective utilization of 
labour, or capacity), ultimately leading to higher productivity. 
In addition, trade can affect R and D and hence productivity in two contrasting ways as argued by 
Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) and Rodrik (1992). A reduction in tariff reduces the market size of a 
domestic (import-competing) producer and therefore reduces the gain from a cost-reducing innovation 
(called as market size effect), whereas it enhances competition from foreign substitutes, thereby 
reducing the mark up (hence monopoly power) leading to increased output (the pro-competitive 
effect). The former has a negative impact on R and D and therefore on productivity, the latter 
represents a positive effect. Trade liberalization also induces firms to invest in R and D to increase 
efficiency, thereby enabling them to face the increased competition arising from international trade 
(Kathuria, 2008). Trade, as found by Melitz (2003), can also force least productive firms to go out of 
the market thereby reallocating resources to the surviving firms so as to increase overall productivity 
of the industry. Several studies show a beneficial effect of exports on firm TFP (see for instance, 
Kraay, 1999; Blalock and Gertler, 2004; Fernandes and Isgut, 2006). The evidence for developing 
countries, including Asian countries, however is mixed (see Das, 2002 for a review of these studies).
The productivity of various inputs in production clearly depends on the quality of public 
infrastructure. For instance, the quality of human capital unambiguously depends on the quality of 
education, health and social services – as provided by the government. Investment on infrastructure 
and social services is thus, another policy variable having positive impact on productivity (Mitra and 
Ural, 2007; Iskasson, 2007). Studies by Tan and Lopez-Acevedo (2002), Aw et al., (2005) among 
others have found positive influence of human capital and training on the firm’s TFP.
Another policy variable that has an adverse affect on the efficiency of the firms is the prevailing 
competitive condition in the sector. Restrictions on free entry and exit of firms hinder competition 
faced by existing firms and thus lower firm efficiency. This also prevents inefficient firms from 
exiting the market. Thus, the productivity of the industry as a whole gets adversely affected by 
restrictive industrial policies. Free entry and exit of firms does not work in isolation, the precise 
impact depends on how it interacts with labour market institutions (Mitra and Ural, 2007). For 
example, easy entry and exit will not have a requisite effect if labour market restrictions on firing of 
workers are in place, since essentially this is an exit barrier. It is also an entry barrier since it 
discourages entry by discouraging firms from hiring permanent workers who would benefit from on-
the-job training (ibid.).
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Empirical evidence also exists for the positive impact of R and D activities on firm productivity
(Griliches, 1998; Kathuria, 2008). Recent literature has also focused on the role of the business 
environment for firm TFP (Hallward-Driemeier, et al., 2003; Dollar, et al., 2005; Wagner, 2007) and 
the effects of foreign ownership on firm TFP (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Kee, 2005).
It can be clearly seen that some of the determinants discussed such as infrastructure and a favourable 
business environment are outcomes of good state-business relations (SBRs). Some indeed are 
determined nationally such as trade and competition policies. Others such as technological factors and 
R and D intensity may be determined at the industry level. However, nationally governed or industry-
specific factors cannot explain why productivity growth for the same industry may differ across 
regions within the same country. Any differences in productivity growth for the same industry across 
regions in the same country can be related to the quality of institutions at the regional level. This is 
well illustrated in Table 1 and Fig. 1, which give the range of productivity and productivity growth for 
some of the key industries across Indian States.
Table 1: Productivity (in Rs.) variation across the States for the same industries for 3 years
Industry Year = 1994 Year = 2000 Year = 2005
Pump, Compressors and Valves 0.76 – 33 256 0.32 – 46 948 0.15 – 38 212
Agriculture and Forestry Machinery 0.61 – 17 0326 0.39 – 43 3879 0.09 – 32 4703
Machine Tools 0.46 – 50 028 0.94 – 23 424 0.66 – 42 884
Food, Beverages and Tobacco Processing 
machinery 1.41 – 43 145 0.72 – 40 504 0.63 – 30 971
Domestic Appliances 0.50 – 31 502 1.23 – 24 931 0.31 – 38 935
.
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Notes: A – Pumps, compressors and valves; B – Agriculture and Forestry Machinery; C – Machine Tools; D –
Food, Beverages and Tobacco Processing Machinery Industry; E – Domestic Appliances.
Fig. 1. Productivity (TFP) growth variation across states for the same industries
State business relations and manufacturing productivity growth in India
5
The table and figure indicate a wide variation in productivity and productivity growth across identical
industries. This calls for an investigation of the role of institutional quality as captured by effective 
state-business relations in explaining the variation in TFPG for the same set of industries across States 
in India.
Why should effective SBRs lead to higher productivity growth?
Effective SBRs can have a positive impact on productivity growth by creating an institutional 
environment where the state provides high quality public goods that matter to the private sector such 
as infrastructure, effective public administration (or the lack of corruption) and secure property rights. 
Public investment in infrastructure is highly complementary to private investment in developing 
countries, and has strong ‘crowding in’ effects (Blejer and Khan, 1984). A well organized private 
sector can make clear to the state where the priorities are for public investment and can monitor the 
quality of such investment. Such high quality investments are more likely to be forthcoming with a 
well organized and responsive state. Effective public administration and lack of expropriation of 
property rights of the private sector is more likely to occur with professionally run and well organized
government agencies and through the direct and indirect pressures that business associations can place 
on government officials.
Effective SBRs can also influence the productivity of investments by leading to better allocation of 
investment funds. Peak and sectoral business associations that are active, independent of the state and 
representative of the private sector in the region, can resolve many of the collective action problems 
that are inherent in developing countries, where most firms are of small and medium size and are 
unable to articulate their views and concerns to agencies of the state. Such business associations can 
provide accurate information on current and future investment opportunities and potential problems to 
its members, invest in training of the workers of member firms, help in enforcing industry quality 
standards and voice the demands of its members to industry ministries and state investment agencies 
(Cammett, 2007). By doing so, such associations can minimize transactions and coordination costs 
and ensure that investments that are made by its members have the highest returns.  Synergistic state-
business relations also minimize the possibility of rent-seeking and collusive behaviour which may 
lead to directly unproductive economic activities (Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati et al., 1984). Thus, 
effective SBRs can be expected to increase the efficiency of investment and of overall productivity 
growth in the economy.
III. Methodology
Growth equation estimation 
In this section, we discuss the empirical specification used to statistically establish the relationship 
between state-business relation (SBR) and TFPG. The following regression function is estimated 
separately for combined, formal and informal sectors. 
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ist eTSBRXaaTFPG  10,, (1)
The subscript i, s and t index the industry, state and time period. TFPG is total factor productivity 
growth, X is a vector that includes other determinants of TFPG such as trade and competition 
variables, SBR is the period-averaged measure for State s at time t (where t=1994-2001 and 2001-
2006) and T is the time dummy, which is equal to 1 when t = 2001-2006 and 0, otherwise. eist is the 
state-industry-time error term. I, F, and C represent Informal, Formal and Combined sector 
respectively.
The trade and competition policy variables used as controls for the above growth equation estimation
include the import-penetration and export orientation ratios, tariff rates and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) at the 4 digit level. We however could not directly control for the R and D intensity, but 
used industry dummies in one of the specifications to see the effect of any industry-specific policies.
We have included a year dummy, T, to capture macroeconomic shocks to capacity utilization, which 
may affect TFP over time.
We test the relationship separately for formal and informal manufacturing sector for two reasons: a)
the duality in Indian manufacturing sector; and b) the way SBR variable has been conceptualized and 
constructed. The Indian manufacturing sector consists of two categories of firms depending on the size 
of the labour force in the firm – formal and informal sector. Firms which are in the formal sector are 
required to adhere to various regulatory norms besides providing several benefits to the workers.4
Apart from this, the reservation of few products for small scale units and tax benefits to them has 
resulted in duality in Indian manufacturing (Mazumdar and Sarkar, 2008). Secondly, as we see later, 
the SBR essentially measures the effectiveness of formal organizations whether they are in the domain 
of the State or of the private sector. Testing the relationship for formal and informal manufacturing in 
a way would be test for this duality and validity of the scope of SBR. 
TFPG estimation
For finding TFPG, we estimate the Cobb-Douglas production function in equation 2 separately for 
each of the 15 major Indian States.5
+ ui + vist (2)
                                                
4 The formal sector in India is defined to be the set of firms who are registered under the Factories Act (1948), 
and by doing so, fall under the purview of labour laws and other government regulations. Firms are required to
register if they employ 10 workers if they use electricity, and 20 workers if they do not use electricity. The 
informal sector in India is considered to be the set of firms which employ less than 10 workers if using 
electricity and 20 workers if not using electricity. The formal and informal sectors in India are often referred to 
as the organized and the unorganized sectors. 
5 The States included are Andhra Pradesh (AP), Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh (MP), Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu (TN), Uttar Pradesh (UP), and West Bengal 
(WB).
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The subscript i, s and t index the industry, state, and time period. The variables Y, L and K represent 
the real value added, labour and capital inputs respectively. ‘A’ is TFP which represents the efficiency 
of the firm in transforming inputs into output. 
The estimation of the coefficients of labour and capital using ordinary least squares (OLS) method 
implicitly assumes that the input choices are determined exogenously. Firm’s input choices can be 
endogenous too. For instance, the number of workers hired by a firm and the quantity of materials 
purchased may depend on unobserved productivity shocks. These are overlooked by the researcher but 
they certainly represent the part of TFP known to the firm. Since input choices and productivity are 
correlated, OLS estimation of production functions will yield biased parameter estimates. To correct 
this endogeneity bias, we employ a methodology recently developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
Researchers in the past have used techniques like fixed effect estimation or the semi-parametric 
methodology developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth OP) to correct this bias. The fixed 
effects estimation however eliminates only unobservable fixed firm characteristics that may affect 
simultaneously input choices and TFP; there may still be unobserved time varying firm characteristics 
affecting input choices and TFP. The main idea behind LP methodology is that an observable firm 
characteristic – intermediate inputs – can be used to proxy the unobserved firm productivity and 
estimate unbiased production function coefficients.
Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) methodology. Simultaneity arises because productivity is observed by 
the profit maximizing firms (but not by the econometrician) early enough to influence their input 
levels (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). This means that the firms will increase (decrease) their use of 
inputs in case of positive (negative) productivity shocks. OLS estimation of production functions thus 
yield biased parameter estimates because it does not account for the unobserved productivity shocks. 
OP method overcomes the simultaneity problem by using the firm’s investment decision to proxy 
unobserved productivity shocks. The estimation rests on two assumptions. First, productivity – a state 
variable in the firm’s dynamic problem – is assumed to follow a Markov process and is unaffected by 
the firm’s control variables. Second, investment – one of the control variables of the firm – becomes 
part of the capital stock with a one period lag. In the OP method, labour is treated as a nondynamic 
input and capital is assumed to be a dynamic input. A firm’s choice of labour has no impact on the 
future profits of the firm. The OP estimation involved two steps. The coefficients of the variable 
inputs and the joint effect of all state variables on output are estimated in the first step. In a two input 
framework, the former is just labour and the latter are capital and productivity. Investment is assumed 
to be a monotonically increasing function of productivity and inverting the investment equation 
nonparametrically provides an observable expression for productivity. This expression is used to 
substitute the unobserved productivity term of the production function, hence allowing identification 
of the variable input elasticities.
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The coefficients of the observable state variables (capital if there are only two inputs) are identified in 
the second step by exploiting the orthogonality of the quasi-fixed capital stock and the current change 
in productivity. A nonparametric term is included in the production function to absorb the impact of 
productivity, to the extent it was known to the firm when it chose investment in the last period. The 
second term included in equation 4 below captures the unobserved productivity shock and uses the 
results of the first stage (i.e., equation 3). 
The estimating equations for the two steps are
(3)
(4)
The functions h and g are approximated nonparametrically by a fourth order polynomial or a kernel 
density. Once both the equations are estimated, we have estimates for all the parameters of interest. 
The labour coefficient is obtained in the first stage and capital coefficient in the second stage. These 
estimates are termed as OP estimates. A major advantage of this approach is the flexible 
characterization of productivity, only assuming that it evolves according to a Markov process. 
However, the method also has few drawbacks. OP method demands a strictly monotonous relationship 
between the proxy, which is investment, and output. This means that observations with zero 
investment have to be dropped from the dataset in order for the correction to be valid. Given that not 
every firm will have strictly positive investment every year, this may lead to a considerable drop in the 
number of observations in the dataset, an obvious efficiency loss. This is all the more important for 
firms in the informal sector, where for years together firms hardly invest in capital. Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) developed an estimation technique that is very much similar to the one developed by OP
but use intermediate inputs (m) as a proxy rather than investment.6 Typically, many datasets will 
contain significantly less zero-observations in materials than in investment. This is what has been used 
in the present study. In LP, the first stage involves estimating the following equation: 
(5)
where is a nonparametric function. The estimates of βl and 
are obtained in the first stage. 
The second stage of the LP estimation obtains the estimate of . Here, like OP, LP assumes that 
productivity () follows a first-order Markov process, and is given by 
(6)
                                                
6 LP use electricity as a proxy in their study. We could not use electricity as majority of firms in the informal 
sector are working without power which would lead to dropping considerable number of firms from our sample. 
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This assumption states that capital does not respond immediately to , which is the innovation in 
productivity over last period’s expectation (i.e., the shock in productivity). It leads directly to the 
following moment condition:
(7)
The equation 7 states that the unexpected part of the innovation in productivity in the current period is 
independent of this period’s capital stock, which was determined by the previous period’s investment. 
Using this moment condition, can be estimated from the following expression:
(8)
This moment condition identifies the capital coefficient, . The saliency of this technique lies in the 
assumption that the current period’s capital stock is determined before the shock in the current 
period’s productivity.
IV. Measuring SBR in India
A major problem associated with testing the impact of effective SBRs on the economy concerns the 
way to properly measure them. Te Velde (2006) was the pioneering study to develop measures of the 
effectiveness of SBRs with an application for sub-Saharan African countries. He argues that an SBR 
index should have four components, which reflect the main aspects of effective SBRs: 
1) the way in which the private sector is organized vis-à-vis the public sector;
2) the way in which the public sector is organized vis-à-vis the private sector;
3) the practice and institutionalization of SBRs;
4) the avoidance of harmful collusive behaviour between the two sectors.
Calli, Mitra and Purhoit (2009) (henceforth CMP) construct a composite SBR measure based on the 
above four dimensions for sixteen Indian states using both primary and secondary data.7 We describe 
below the manner CMP operationalise the measurement of SBR in India.
The role of the private sector in SBR (SBR Private)
The most relevant way in which the private sector can organize itself vis-à-vis the public sector is via 
an umbrella organization. One of the major roles of such an organization is arguably lobbying the 
State to produce legislations and regulations that may favour the businesses. As argued by Kohli 
(2006) and confirmed by the fieldwork in CMP this is clearly the case in India as well. CMP capture 
the role of the private sector by measuring the quality and effectiveness of the umbrella business 
                                                
7 One important characteristic of this measure that is relevant for the empirical analysis in the paper is that it 
varies both over time and space, as the measure has been computed for the 15 major Indian states for the period 
1985-2006. Due to the availability of firm level data only from 1994-95, we use the SBR measure from 1994 
onwards. The variations in the measure both in the time-series and cross-sectional dimensions allow us to 
estimate the effects of effective SBRs on economic growth more precisely than may have been possible using 
cross-sectional measures of regional institutional quality such as the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators 
which are only available for a few years (World Bank, 2009). 
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association (representing all sectors) and two other business associations representing the major 
sectors in each state. For each of these associations they use the following variables for such 
measurement: 
a) Whether the private sector is organized through an umbrella organization or not (a score of 1 
is given in each year the association existed, 0 otherwise). 
b) Whether the private sector association has a website or not: The variable takes a value of zero 
in any year in which the organization does not have a website and 1 otherwise. This is likely 
to proxy for the quality of the organizational structure as well as its outside visibility. 
Evidence from their fieldwork confirms that organizations appearing to be more structured 
and organized have had an active website in place for a longer time.
c) How frequently the website is updated: Again, this captures the efficiency of internal 
processes (which makes frequent updates possible) as well as the level of activity of the 
organization. The need for updating the website more frequently should increase with the 
intensity of the organization’s activity.8
d) Whether the association owns its office premises (value of 1) or not (value 0). This variable 
proxies the level of the organization’s resources as well as the extent to which the association 
is willing to invest in costly physical assets, with owned premises suggesting a more 
established business association. 
The role of the public sector in SBR (SBR Public)
CMP measure the role of the public sector in SBR by two measures:
a) the presence of state owned or state participated productive corporations, which are 
investment promotion agencies active in most states, i.e. Financial, Infrastructure 
Development and Tourism Development Corporations. These represent important types of 
pro-business engagements with benefits for all sectors (with the exception of the tourism 
corporation, which is the only sectoral corporation with a presence in virtually all states). 
CMP exploit the different timing of establishment of these corporations across states by 
constructing a cumulative sub-index ranging in value between 0 and 1 which is the average of 
four dummy variables, one for each organization. At any point of time the dummy for an 
organization takes the value of 1 if it is in place and 0 otherwise. 
b) CMP also assess the role of the public sector via the governments’ signalling of their relative 
priorities through the allocation of public resources towards economic activities. They 
measure this by the share of state expenditures on economic services as a ratio of total 
                                                
8 This variable is coded as the number of times the website is updated in a month, thus a monthly update has the 
value of 1, a weekly update has the value of 4.5, a daily update is equal to 30, an annual update is equal to 1/12, 
etc.
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government expenditures and by the share of industry expenditures in total expenditures on 
economic services. Industry expenditure is that part of expenditure on economic services 
which is most closely related to SBR promotion activities.9
The interaction between states and businesses (SBR Practice)
CMP measure the interaction between state governments and the business sector in two ways:
a) Index of labour regulation: Industrial relations in India fall under the joint jurisdiction of the 
central and state governments under the Indian constitution. Industrial relations are governed 
by the Trade Unions Act of 1926, which specifies the conditions that a trade union needs to 
satisfy in order to be recognized under the act and the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947, 
which sets out the institutions for adjudication of disputes (Ahsan et al., 2008).  The IDA has 
been extensively amended by state governments during the post-independence period. CMP 
use the index of labour regulation proposed by Besley and Burgess (2000), who code each 
state amendment as neutral (0), pro-worker (+1) and pro-employer (-1), and then cumulate the 
scores over time for the period 1947-1997. CMP update this index to 2006. As CMP argue, a 
closer degree of interaction between business and state governments would be reflected in 
more pro-employer labour market regulation.10
b) Stamp Duty: CMP take state-wise stamp duties as proxies for the attitude of the state 
governments towards business establishments and their expansion. These proxies are valid 
because a stamp duty is a tax on the value of a transaction, most commonly on the transfer of 
movable and immovable properties and instruments used in commercial and business 
transactions. Moreover, stamp duties are one of the major sources of revenues for state 
governments and one of the few tax rates which state governments have the power to levy, 
when most tax rates are set by the Central government. 
Mechanisms to avoid collusive behaviour (SBR Collusive)
CMP use the following measures to capture the transparency of SBRs: 
a) The gross output of firms belonging to delicensed industries as a proportion of total 
industrial GDP. The License Raj was a system of centralized controls regulating entry and 
production activity introduced by the Indian federal government in and which applied to all 
states in India. There were two waves of delicensing as part of economic reforms, the first in 
1985, and the second in 1991. Delicensing introduced competition and reduced rent-seeking 
by corporations entrenched with public powers. As argued by Aghion et al., 2006, p. 5, ‘Since 
                                                
9 This is corroborated by CMP fieldwork results which indicate that only industry departments engage with the 
business sector in a ‘significant’ manner, identifying its needs and facilitating its operations.  
10 A similar argument is made by Rodrik and Subramanian (2004, p.17) who suggest that the Besley-Burgess 
index is ‘a measure of how pro-labour (and anti-business) the environment in different states was.’
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the Licensing Committee reviewed applications on a sequential, first-come, first-served basis, 
and the five-year plans laid down targets or ceilings for industrial capacity, this provided an 
incentive for pre-emptive license applications. This system tended to favour the larger 
industrial houses (e.g. Birla, J.K. and Tata) which were better informed and organized and 
submitted multiple early applications as a means of foreclosing on plan capacity.’ As the 
decision of what industries to delicense was made at the central level, this effectively provides 
an exogenous source of change in the possible extent of collusive behaviour at the state level.
b) Whether the private sector umbrella association has a regular publication informing its 
members. This measure captures the transparency of the organization’s activities. Higher 
transparency would be associated with lower probability of collusive behaviour which may 
harm business not entrenched with public authorities. 
c) The frequency with which the publication is produced and distributed. As in the case of the 
organization’s website, this frequency would also determine the level of transparency in the 
association’s activities.11
As CMP correctly argue, the indices constructed through these variables have two main advantages 
over the traditional investment climate indicators. First, they cover a larger time span than any other 
indicators on India states. This allows one to examine the evolution of the relevant economic 
institution over different periods. Second, by not being based on firms’ perceptions, they avoid the 
measurement error problem typical of subjective survey response data. Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2001) argue that the likely causal correlation of this measurement error with dependent variables may 
generate biased estimated coefficients. 
CMP normalize the data so as to make the individual variables vary over a common range and to make 
the increase in a variable signal an improvement in the index. Then they use equal weights for each of 
the sub-components of the four dimensions of effective SBRs to arrive at the four components of SBR 
Private, SBR Public, SBR Practice and SBR Collusive, which are then aggregated to obtain the overall 
SBR measure.12    
In Fig. 2, we present the period averaged SBR index for 1994-2000 and 2001-2005 respectively As is 
clear, there are strong differences in the effectiveness of state business relations across Indian States. 
These differences though seem to have persisted over time, but some states, such as Assam, 
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh among others have shown remarkable improvement over the period.
                                                
11 This variable is coded analogously to the frequency of website update. 
12 To obtain the SBR Private component, the apex business association is given a weight of 1 and the two 
sectoral associations were given zero weights. CMP experiment with different weights for apex and sectoral 
business associations and find that there is a strong correlation between SBR measures obtained under different 
weighting schemes. We adopt the weights of 1 for the apex business association and 0 for the sectoral business 
associations for the main regressions but our results are also robust to the use of SBR indices calculated through 
different weights (i.e. assigning the same weight of one third to each, or assigning 0.5 weight to the apex body, 
and 0.25 each to the two leading sectoral business associations).
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Fig. 2. Measure of effective state business relations across Indian states
V. Data and Variables
Data for the productivity estimation
A key feature of the present paper is the use of firm level data for both formal and informal
manufacturing sector. The data for the informal manufacturing sector for the selected States are 
obtained from the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) surveys on the informal
manufacturing sector for 1994-95, 2000-01 and 2005-06.13 In order to compute TFPG for a sector,
data for the same 3 years for the formal sector are obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries 
(ASI).14 We have aggregated the unit level data to arrive at the four-digit National Industrial 
Classification industry level data for each state. The four-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC) 
used by the Indian statistical agencies is equivalent to the ISIC five digit level. To use the Levinsohn-
Petrin technique, we considered only those industries for which 3 year data was available. While 
aggregating the data up to four digit level, we have omitted units reporting zero or negative capital 
stock, zero output and zero employment.15
                                                
13 The NSSO conducts surveys on the informal manufacturing sector quinquennially. Though the NSSO initiated 
this survey in 1978-79, a complete firm level dataset was available only from 1994-95. This fits well with our 
objective too. 
14 It is important to note here that at the time of the analysis the ASI data for 2005-06 was yet to be released. On 
account of it, we have considered the ASI dataset for the year 2004-05. 
15 In 2000, Bihar, MP and UP were bifurcated and three new States - Uttrakhand, Chattisgarh and Jharkhand 
were formed, for the present analysis, these three States were merged with their parent States so as to have 
consistent data for all the three time periods.
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Variables 
The variables used in TFP estimates are output, labour, capital, and intermediate inputs. To make the 
values of output, capital and intermediate inputs comparable over time and across industries and 
States, suitable deflators have been used as discussed below. 
Output: As in common in the literature, gross value added (GVA) is used as the measure of output in 
this study (Goldar, 1986; Ahluwalia, 1991; Balakrishnan and Pushpangadan, 1994, 1998). The 
advantage of GVA over gross output as a measure of output is that it allows comparison between the 
firms that are using heterogeneous raw materials (Griliches and Ringsted, 1971) and takes into 
account differences and changes in the quality of inputs (Salim and Kalirajan, 1999). We also use the 
single deflation method (where nominal value added is deflated by the output price index) in 
estimating real GVA rather than the double deflation method (where the output and material inputs are 
deflated separately) due to the nonavailability of industry specific input deflators. For the output price 
deflator, we use the industry specific wholesale price index.
Capital: We have used the total fixed assets as given in the ASI and NSSO reports to represent 
capital16 input in the formal and informal sectors respectively. The total fixed assets are deflated by 
WPI for machinery and machine tools in both the sectors. The WPI for machinery and machine tools 
are not available at the industry level forcing us to use the values at the all India level. The values are 
expressed in 1993-94 prices. 
Labour: Total number of persons engaged is used as the measure of labour input. Since working 
proprietors / owners and supervisory/managerial staff have a significant influence on the productivity 
of a firm, the number of persons engaged was preferred to the total number of workers.
Data for the growth equation estimation 
The control variables for the TFP growth equation estimation are import-penetration and export 
orientation ratios, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Data on exports orientation and import
penetration are obtained from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). These data are at the 3-digit ISIC level and 
are matched to the NIC 2-digit industry level. As exports and imports data are reported in US dollars, 
we converted them to Indian Rupees using the dollar-rupee exchange rates prevailed during the 
selected sample years. These figures are then deflated using WPI for manufactured products at the 
two-digit industry level. All values are expressed in 1993-94 prices. Data on HHI are drawn from the 
PROWESS database of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). 
The specific variables used in the regressions are: 
                                                
16 The capital input includes land, buildings and other construction, plant and machinery, transport equipment, 
tools and other fixed assets that have a normal economic life of more than one year from the date of acquisition.
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Import penetration ratio (IMPEN): for a particular industry is defined as the ratio of its imports to 
domestic demand and is calculated as: IMPEN = Real imports / Domestic demand, where Domestic 
demand = Real output + Real imports – Real exports 
Export orientation ratio (EXPOR): for a particular industry is the ratio of its exports to its output. It
is given as: EXPOR = Real exports / Real Output
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): HHI is an indicator of the extent of competition among firms 
in an industry. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the 50 largest firms (or 
summed over all the firms if there are fewer than 50) within the industry. The index can vary from 
zero to one with increases in the HHI reflecting a decline in competition and an increase of market 
power and vice versa. 
Table 2 gives the summary statistics for the SBR, trade and competition variables for the two time 
periods – 1994-2000 and 2001-2005. We can easily infer the following: a) carrying out business has 
become somewhat easier, as SBR variables have increased over the period (row 1); b) though trade 
restrictions on the manufacturing sector has lessened over time, this has not led to increased import 
penetration or export orientation (rows 2, 3, 5 and 6); and c) competition has increased in the Indian 
manufacturing sector, as evident from the decline in HHI (row 4).
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Table 2. Average values for SBR, trade and competition variables
Variable 1994-2000 2001-2005
1 SBR 0.54
(0.111)
0.59
(0.124)
2 HHI 0.17
(0.108)
0.164
(0.103)
3 IMPEN 0.096
(0.138)
0.096
(0.138)
4 EXPOR 0.132
(0.189)
0.0398
(0.064)
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviation.
Productivity growth estimates
The section now gives the productivity growth estimates. The estimates are obtained using production 
function approach, where the function is estimated for 15 major Indian States using LP method
separately for formal, informal and combined sectors using four-digit industry level data for the three 
time periods.17
Tables 3, 4 and 5 give the TFPG18 estimates for formal, informal and combined manufacturing sectors 
respectively. The TFP grew steadily in the formal manufacturing sector over the period 1994-2005 
(Table 3). A comparison of TFPG during 1994-2001 and 2001-2005 reveals that TFP growth 
accelerated in the latter period as compared to the former. The average annual TFPG for the 15 States 
was 0.04 per cent in the first period, which increased to 3.14 per cent during the second period. We 
also find that the aggregate growth masks the inter-regional differences in productivity growth. 
                                                
17 The estimation is carried out in STATA 11.
18 It is to be noted that wherever growth rate has been computed in Table 3 or elsewhere, it is the compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) for the period. The CAGR is calculated as [(Yt/Yo)
(1/t)-1]*100, where Yt and Yo are 
the terminal and initial values of the variable and ‘t’ is the time over which CAGR has to be calculated. 
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Table 3. Total factor productivity growth in the formal sector
State
1994-2001 2001-2005 1994-2005
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Punjab 1.74 22.81 2.22 21.7 3.04 10.64
Haryana -2.97 22.43 2.56 31.47 -1.79 15.7
Rajasthan -0.73 22.46 1.09 36.87 -1.96 22.38
UP -1.28 19.05 6.65 24.24 1.29 10.53
Bihar -0.94 24.71 -3.8 27.02 -5.24 22.16
Assam 3.89 32.78 1.66 22.33 4.06 10.34
WB -0.59 14.37 4.82 42.77 -0.94 14.16
Orissa -0.08 16.07 1.23 27.11 -0.69 18.37
MP 6.31 28.54 0.71 22.14 4.69 11.58
Gujarat 5.52 30.34 0.74 29.15 5.2 17.9
Maharashtra -6.17 8.86 5.14 17.08 -1.64 6.63
AP -1.32 11.87 9.57 40.13 1.71 7.5
Karnataka -0.16 20.34 8.2 51.56 2.83 10.95
Kerala 0.47 14.12 3.13 20.09 -0.31 12.1
TN -3.11 11.54 3.25 24.25 -0.58 6.91
Mean 0.04 3.14 0.64
Notes: * estimated from the data without outliers.19
We notice a completely different picture with regard to TFP growth in the informal manufacturing 
sector (Table 4). TFP reported a steady decline over the period 1994-2005. The decline that started 
during 1994-2001 continued unabated in the period 2001-2005 with a decline of 16 per cent in this 
period. Majority of the States registered TFP decline in both the periods. 
Table 4. Total factor productivity growth in the informal sector
State
1994-2001 2001-2005 1994-2005
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Punjab -7.69 10.39 -3.72 24.57 -6.25 12.02
Haryana -8.91 10.55 -11.04 21.26 -10.63 10.69
Rajasthan -7.6 10.23 -11.48 20.51 -9.96 10.1
UP -2.8 21.58 4.44 20.83 0.6 9.51
Bihar 0.74 24.26 -13.75 31.26 -8.48 22.2
Assam -3.89 10.92 -32.52 12.27 -18.33 7.73
WB -4.54 8.49 -10.75 21.38 -8.48 10.55
Orissa -6.67 10.4 -34.18 9.74 -20.29 4.59
MP 7.99 32.95 -4.06 23.38 4.92 14.92
Gujarat -2.51 12.06 -19.38 16.9 -10.7 8.83
Maharashtra -2.45 10.22 -4.74 22.7 -4.03 12.06
AP -3.08 9.88 -26.98 16.26 -14.73 9.08
Karnataka -3.64 10.79 -26.52 15.2 -15.26 9.52
Kerala -13.7 12.39 -22.21 14.3 -17.94 8.89
TN -1.42 6.96 -23.14 19.21 -12.59 9.63
Mean -4.01 -16.0 -10.14
Notes: Same as Table 3. 
                                                
19 On checking standard deviation of TFPG, it was found that for some States, few industries were influencing 
TFPG. The present table gives TFPG estimates after omitting these industries. . 
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Table 5. Total factor productivity growth in the combined sector (formal + informal)
States
1994-2001 2001-2005 1994-2005
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Punjab -0.46 21.06 -1.46 23.45 0.73 10.46
Haryana -5.69 22.1 0.61 26.55 -3.34 14.82
Rajasthan -0.8 22.95 -0.69 28.06 -1.29 17.82
Uttar Pradesh -1.27 19.06 4.74 19.11 1.08 9.57
Bihar -0.68 24.38 -6.04 22.21 -5.98 20.57
Assam 3.02 32.01 -8.31 24.58 -1.39 13.63
West Bengal -1.96 13.13 1.4 27.84 -1.94 13.19
Orissa 0.9 26.45 -6.35 25.85 -4.54 18.83
Madhya Pradesh 2.8 26.49 2.27 18.62 3.52 9.86
Gujarat -0.79 26.27 24.8 219.8 2.36 15.66
Maharashtra -6.37 9.58 3.38 14.79 -1.39 6.73
Andhra Pradesh -2.42 12.19 4.94 31.77 -0.12 8.39
Karnataka -0.7 14.81 2.42 25.89 1.16 8.99
Kerala -4.32 11.83 1.35 18.78 -3.31 12.03
Tamil Nadu -3.63 11.34 0.74 21.73 -1.1 6.49
Mean -1.49 1.59 -1.04
Notes: Same as Table 3
As regards the combined manufacturing sector, TFP registered a turnaround in the second period, 
2001-2006. TFP switched over from a negative growth of 1.5 per cent per annum in 1995-2001 to a 
positive growth rate of 1.6 per cent per annum during 2001-2006. 
VI. Estimation of the TFPG Growth Equation - Results
Table 6 gives results for the combined manufacturing sector. We present the results for the relative 
change in these variables (i.e., log differences) rather than the absolute values. The choice of log 
differences is dictated by the fact that any productivity shock in a period will be governed more by the 
changed trade regime or competition instead of the actual regime.20 Further, SBR variable is in the 
form of 1+logSBR. Given the fact that SBR ranges between zero and one, unit value was added so that 
its log gives positive SBR.
                                                
20 We also experimented with used these variables in average form and the beginning of the period. The results 
are not reported but in all these models, coefficient and significance of the SBR variable hardly changed. 
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Table 6. SBR and productivity growth across Indian states, robust estimations: combined 
manufacturing sector
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(IV)
1 SBR 103.27*
(27.83)
20.14*
(10.14)
15.51*
(8.68)
20.04*
(9.94)
2 HHI -7.00
(35.19)
8.42
(20.08)
--
8.37
(20.08)
3 IMPEN -196.75
(160.20)
13.21
(87.46)
--
13.39
(87.16)
4 EXPOR 35.40
(57.06)
-0.002
(38.28)
--
0.097
(38.07)
5 Outlier
--
2980.60*
(290.26)
2850.83*
(240.81)
2980.65*
(290.28)
6 Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
7 Industry effects -- -- Yes --
8 R Squared 0.02 0.75 0.74 0.75
9 N 1751 1751 2754 1751
Notes: * indicates significance at minimum 10% level; Figures in the parentheses are SE; the results are 
obtained after correcting for heteroskedasticity if any; the number of observations in Models 1, 
2 and 4 are less because for some of the industries we do not have data on trade and 
competition variables.
From the table, it is clear that state-business relation (row 1) is key factor in influencing the TFP 
growth of Indian industry (Model 1). However, none of the trade variables and competition variable is 
significant though, they have come with the right sign (rows 2, 3 and 4). One possible reason for trade 
variables not attaining significance is the fact that major trade reforms were carried out in 1991, with 
little variation in the trade regime since the early 1990s.21 Another reason for the variable not affecting 
TFPG is the level of disaggregation of trade variables used,22 which being at three digit levels whereas 
TFPG is computed at the four digit level. Same is the case with HHI, which too has been computed at 
the three digit level. 
A closer look at the TFPG estimates indicates that a few industries have very high TFPG during the 
period. It is possible that these industries might be driving the SBR results. The inclusion of a dummy 
for these outliers industries (Model 2) not only improves our estimates, the explanatory power of the 
model also increases. As a further robustness test, we include only industry dummies instead of 
IMPEN, EXPOR and HHI, to capture industry-specific intrinsic technological progress that may affect 
TFPG. The inclusion of industry dummies (instead of trade and competition variables) does not 
change the results (Model 3). The SBR variable is robust to these alternate specifications.
Testing for potential endogeneity 
                                                
21 We have also used simple and weighted tariff rates instead of import penetration and export orientation, with 
no change in our results on the lack of significance of the trade variables.
22 Including trade variables at higher aggregation is because it is very difficult to obtain at such a disaggregated 
level of industrial classification.
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One potential concern with our results is that the SBR variable may be endogenous to productivity 
growth in a particular state. There are two possible ways that this may happen. More productive 
industries may be able to organize themselves better and bring out more effective SBRs. Also, the 
presence of good SBRs in a particular state may lead to more productive firms from other states to 
relocate to that state. In order to control for the potential endogeneity of the SBR variable, we used 
two sets of instruments: one based on land reform legislation enacted by Indian states in different 
points in time, and the other based on the nature of the political regime in a given state. 
Land reform was implemented under the 1949 Indian legislation, according to which states are granted 
the powers to enact (and implement) land reforms. There are significant differences in the intensity 
with which states have enacted the various types of land reform legislation over time. We use the 
measure of intensity of land reform across different states as constructed by Besley and Burgess 
(2000). Since there has not been any major land reform legislation since 1992 (see World Bank,
2007), we retain the same values for the land reform variable for the post-1992 period. We postulate 
that the political process underlying SBR was the mirror image to that underlying land reform 
legislation. States which implemented land reform aggressively were likely to be concerned mainly 
with the rural sector and the rural poor, while being relatively insensitive to the needs of the 
industrialists.
The second type of instrument is based on the results of the political elections at the state level. We 
exploit the fact that SBRs are the outcome of a political process, with different groupings in state 
legislatures (the Vidhan Sabha) having different propensity to engage with businesses. We use data 
from records of the number of seats won by different national parties at each of the state elections 
under four broad groupings in line with the classification by Besley and Burgess (2000). We express 
these as a share of total seats in the legislature. We use average of the preceding 4 years to decrease 
the potential concern about their endogeneity.
Model 4 in Table 6 are the results of the instrument variables (IV) estimations to account for potential 
endogeneity. The coefficients for SBR and other variables however do not change. Thus, endogeneity 
is not a problem with our estimations. This is also verified by Wooldridge's (1995) robust score test, 
which is not significant, thereby rejecting endogeneity.
To see the robustness of results, we experimented with different specifications of SBR. The results, 
though not reported, are fairly robust to irrespective of how we include different trade and competition 
variables. We also include a dummy for ‘Left’ oriented governments and a dummy for states which 
have seen to be backward in nature, termed as the BIMARU states (literal meaning ‘sick’).23 Our SBR 
results are robust to these controls.
                                                
23 These states are Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. Left oriented governments have been 
been in place in Kerala and West Bengal.
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Effect of SBR on formal and informal manufacturing
The results thus indicate that institution of state-business relation has positively impacted the TFP 
growth of Indian industry. However, the way SBR has been constructed (refer section 4), it is more 
akin to measuring the effectiveness of formal organizations whether they are in the domain of the 
State or of the private sector. Therefore, the effect of SBR should be mainly on the formal
manufacturing; the informal sector is less likely to benefit from effective SBRs. Moreover, given the 
duality in Indian manufacturing sector (Mazumdar and Sarkar, 2008), the informal sector may not be 
affected by even trade related reforms or the prevailing competitive market structure. Thus, it is 
important to carry out estimates for formal and informal manufacturing sector separately. Tables 7 and 
8 give results for formal and informal manufacturing sectors respectively. The scheme of analysis is 
same as followed in combined manufacturing. 
Table 7. SBR and productivity growth across Indian states, robust estimations: formal
manufacturing sector
SBR measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(IV)
1 SBR 241.74*
(76.62)
73.98*
(36.53)
61.2*
(31.93)
72.52*
(35.7)
2 HHI -24.09
(73.0)
65.23
(83.31)
--
65.23
(83.31)
3 IMPEN -228.05
(417.29)
97.78
(317.92)
--
100.6
(316.52)
4 EXPOR -13.77
(123.1)
19.37
(139.30)
--
20.89
(138.58)
5 Outlier
--
6110.15*
(1057.18)
5622.54*
(809.4)
6110.93*
(1057.3)
6 Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
7 Industry effects -- -- Yes --
8 R Squared 0.02 0.49 0.49 0.49
9 N 1687 1687 2572 1687
Notes: Same as Table 6
As conjectured, SBR is found to have significant effect on the TFPG of formal sector (Table 7). The 
coefficient of SBR variable for the formal manufacturing sector (row 1, Table 7) becomes more 
meaningful when we control for few industries having abnormally high TFPG (Models 2 and 3). With 
respect to trade and competition variables, none of them is found to have any impact on TFPG for the 
formal sector variable. Contrary to our expectation, for informal sector, in one of the specifications, 
with industry dummies instead of trade and competition variables, the results indicate that effective 
SBR in the state leads to a decline in TFPG (Model 3). One possible reason could be the potential 
endogeneity of SBR. The Wooldridge (2005) endogeneity test for the informal sector confirms weak 
endogeneity. The IV results change accordingly (Model 4). The IV estimation, however do not change 
the result for formal manufacturing, indicating no endogeneity. It is quite possible that a favourable 
business climate may be signaling firms in informal sector to relocate to the states having good SBR. 
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But once re-located, they may not gain much as the presence of effective SBR in the state primarily 
affects the formal manufacturing sector.
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Table 8. SBR and productivity growth across Indian states, robust estimations: informal
manufacturing sector
SBR measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(IV)
1 SBR 18.18
(13.53)
-5.19
(4.30)
-13.28*
(4.31)
-4.62
(4.3)
2 HHI -39.95*
(21.40)
9.47*
(5.53)
--
9.67*
(5.58)
3 IMPEN 20.22
(102.24)
25.24
(40.76)
--
23.96
(40.54)
4 EXPOR 90.16*
(44.76)
-12.09
(15.40)
--
-12.62
(0.82)
5 Outlier
--
3277.28*
(610.81)
3275.0*
(606.9)
3277.07*
(610.76)
6 Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
7 Industry effects -- -- Yes --
8 R Squared 0.02 0.74 0.74 0.74
9 N 1291 1291 2112 1291
Note: Same as Table 6
On the basis of results, we can say that effective SBR has a direct impact on the TFPG of the 
manufacturing sector. The effect however is confined to the formal sector only. This supports that 
there exist duality in Indian manufacturing. The formalized institutions and organizations involving 
the state and the business sector that affect productivity of the formal sector may not have much 
relevance for the informal sector.
VII. Conclusions
In contrast to previous studies that have examined the effects of trade and market structure on 
productivity growth in industry, in this study, we address the role of institutional quality as captured 
by effective state-business relationships (SBRs) in influencing sectoral productivity. Our empirical 
context is India, where India’s federal structure and the significant political autonomy and 
independence in legislative powers enjoyed by State governments, along with regional variations in 
the collective strength of the economic and political elite allows for the variation in effective state-
business relations across Indian States and over time. We use measures of effective SBRs developed 
by Cali, Mitra and Purohit (2009) for 15 Indian States over the period 1994-2005 and determine 
whether variations in the effectiveness of SBR both across States and over time can explain total 
factor productivity growth in Indian manufacturing, independent of variables that capture trade open-
ness and market structure across disaggregated Indian industries. A key feature of the present paper is 
the use of unit level data for both formal and informal manufacturing sector. 
The study employs a Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate TFPG for nearly 90 industries for
15 major States in India for formal, informal and combined sectors using four-digit level data. To 
correct the endogeneity bias associated with the production function estimation, we use a method 
recently developed by Levinsohn and Petrin. The TFPG estimates as obtained from the production 
function are then used to see the effect of SBRs.
TFP grew steadily in the formal manufacturing sector while reported a decline in the informal
manufacturing sector. The results indicate that SBR has positively affected the TFP growth of Indian 
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industry. To see how duality between the formal and informal sectors affects SBR influence, the 
estimates are carried out for formal and informal manufacturing sector separately. SBR is found to 
have no effect on the TFPG of informal sectors. The coefficient of SBR variable for the formal
manufacturing sector is not only significant in all the variants but also at least 4-5 times that of the 
coefficient for the informal manufacturing sector. We also find that our results are robust to alternate 
specifications and to possible endogeneity concerns to do with the SBR measure. Our results suggest 
that independent of policy measures that bring out trade openness and greater competition, there is a 
role for stronger and more synergistic relations between the state and the private sector to bring about 
sustained increases in productivity and consequently in standards of living.
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